Can you tell us from Buj, how did parliamentary elections go?

Thanks for your insight, which is great to read from Bujumbura (even with a bit of delay).

Just a footnote: in French, it's parti au pouvoir (in power) rather than parti du pouvoir (party of power). Not terribly different from the English term?

I was hella surprised to hear Sinduhije talk about rebellion, but these are the times, I guess. I think the spoiling approach you've described is precisely what people are worried about. That, and the rather annoyed crew of would-be DDR-ers. I'm assuming the returned refugees who don't have land any longer are too old to wage bush warfare, or they'd also be at least something to worry about.

I've heard from a lot of people that the CNDD-FDD win is plausible. I don't know enough to say anything about it, and a chorus of voices all saying the same thing is obviously compelling. But that's also not exactly the point: Why not handle the PV issue? Why not actually have a conversation with the opposition (which CENI refused for weeks to do)? I'm not saying these things as a sympathizer with one side or another; these are the questions a reporter wants to ask.

I've also heard your explanation about the opposition's stance from others. It makes sense, but it also doesn't theorize away the legitimate, and acknowledged, problems f the communal vote. I've highlighted only a few; there are more. Until they're dealt with, I think the opposition is going to continue to feel like it has a point.

However, I disagree that the opposition's strategy was one without risk, as you suggest by saying there was "little lost" in nay-saying the results. In fact, they didn't succeed in generating international pressure on the ruling party; they succeeded in getting the international community (I'm thinking especially EU and UN) to stand by the electoral results, thereby isolating the opposition further. That was a big risk, and they didn't win on that one. And the international community seems just fine to sigh and say, "We wish this democracy had some pluralism" but not to do more than that --- so I don't know that the message that the ruling party needs the opposition to signify political inclusiveness was necessarily reinforced. The opposite, I'd say.

I enjoy your reporting. Thanks for the coverage. A couple comments:

On the vote rigging accusations, I've tended to be quite skeptical about the accusations. The opposition strategy seems to be largely one of delegitimizing a process that they cannot win given their general lack of mass appeal (beyond Bujumbura and certain enclaves, e.g. in Bururi). The boycott was a relatively cheap exercise for the opposition: there was no hope of any of the opposition coming close to winning (even in an election with absolutely zero fraud), so there was little lost in that regard. At the same time, by raising a stink, the opposition could generate some international pressure to make the ruling party appreciate that they simply cannot exclude the opposition. The ruling party needs the opposition to legitimize their electoral victory and, perhaps more importantly, to satisfy the preference among donors for an inclusive political process. The opposition, seeing this as the only currency available to them, is being strategic in how they use it.

True, the ruling party has had much more in the way of opportunity and resources to solidify their mass appeal, and so one could argue that the playing field over the years has not been level. In addition, the ruling party has been quite disappointing in their legislative record since 2005 (though as it takes two to tango, the opposition has shown as much interest in spoiling as making things happen on the floor of the assembly). But based on the evidence that has been produced by various researchers over the past decade (my own research included), the results of the communal polls, as well as the turnout and votes among those who turned out in the presidential polls, strike me as well within the range of plausible levels of CNDD-FDD support throughout the country. (Again, with Buja and Bururi, are exceptions. However, Buja and Bururi account for maybe 10% of the country's population, even if they host a highly disproportionate share of the country's political and economic activity.)

On the possibility of renewed rebellion, recall that the CNDD-FDD's ascendancy was due largely to their military success (which itself had a lot to do with the support they were able to muster from the population, sometimes through voluntary contributions but of course also through coercion at times). With military integration complete, it's hard to imagine anyone picking a real fight with them now. One could imagine FNL members deciding that mainstream participation was not fruitful at this time, and returning to the kind of spoiling that they used during the peace process up to 2008/9. In addition, there are always hints of intrigue from among the "old" Bururi elite, with their ties in the military and abroad (although accusations along these lines often have less to do with genuine coup threats than the need for the ruling party to bind political opponents). But again, the military has been thoroughly reformed and so these kinds of plots are much less complelling than in 1993, say. The talk of the likes of Sinduhije turning to rebellion sound rather comical, I must say.

Cheers,
Cyrus